From a2eefda9e3e3aab1b117ccf60934479875c74ed6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Date: Fri, 3 Nov 2023 13:28:27 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Revert "kasan: print the original fault addr when access invalid shadow" This reverts commit 1684909df3f4810afc8bae01a6e3842dfb5366f5 which is commit babddbfb7d7d70ae7f10fedd75a45d8ad75fdddf upstream. It just flat out breaks the build for KASAN builds, so revert it. Odd. Fixes: 1684909df3f4 ("kasan: print the original fault addr when access invalid shadow") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Change-Id: Ida71f61b6ea32f2682091407144032928891c83e --- include/linux/kasan.h | 6 +++--- mm/kasan/report.c | 4 +++- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h index c9ec3682f594..629309182a78 100644 --- a/include/linux/kasan.h +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h @@ -475,10 +475,10 @@ static inline void kasan_free_module_shadow(const struct vm_struct *vm) {} #endif /* (CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS) && !CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr); -#else /* CONFIG_KASAN */ +#else /* CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE */ static inline void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr) { } -#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */ +#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE */ #endif /* LINUX_KASAN_H */ diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c index 3f202299ed46..dfe686be59df 100644 --- a/mm/kasan/report.c +++ b/mm/kasan/report.c @@ -560,8 +560,9 @@ void kasan_report_async(void) } #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_HW_TAGS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE /* - * With CONFIG_KASAN, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high + * With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high * canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads * before the actual access. For addresses in the low canonical half of the * address space, as well as most non-canonical addresses, that out-of-bounds @@ -597,3 +598,4 @@ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr) pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type, orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE - 1); } +#endif