Known behavior changes:
- `MemorySourceAccessor`'s comparison operators no longer forget to
compare the `SourceAccessor` base class.
Progress on #10832
What remains for that issue is hopefully much easier!
The recent fix for CVE-2024-38531 broke the sandbox on macOS
completely. As it’s not practical to use `chroot(2)` on
macOS, the build takes place in the main filesystem tree, and the
world‐unreadable wrapper directory prevents the build from accessing
its `$TMPDIR` at all.
The macOS sandbox probably shouldn’t be treated as any kind of a
security boundary in its current state, but this specific vulnerability
wasn’t possible to exploit on macOS anyway, as creating `set{u,g}id`
binaries is blocked by sandbox policy.
Locking down the build sandbox further may be a good idea in future,
but it already has significant compatibility issues. For now, restore
the previous status quo on macOS.
Thanks to @alois31 for helping me come to a better understanding of
the vulnerability.
Fixes: 1d3696f0fbCloses: #11002
- use the iterator in `CanonPath` to count `level`
- use the `CanonPath::basename` method
- use `CanonPath::root` instead of `CanonPath{""}`
- remove `Path` and `PathView`, use `std::filesystem::path` directly
Inspired by
010ff57ebb
From the original PR:
> We do not have any of these warnings appearing at the moment, but
> it seems like a good idea to enable [[nodiscard]] checking anyway.
> Once we start introducing more functions with must-use conditions we will
> need such checking, and the rust stdlib has proven them very useful.
The old `std::variant` is bad because we aren't adding a new case to
`FileIngestionMethod` so much as we are defining a separate concept ---
store object content addressing rather than file system object content
addressing. As such, it is more correct to just create a fresh
enumeration.
Co-authored-by: Robert Hensing <roberth@users.noreply.github.com>
Previously, the .chroot directory had permission 750 or 755 (depending
on the uid-range system feature) and was owned by root/nixbld. This
makes it possible for any nixbld user (if uid-range is disabled) or
any user (if uid-range is enabled) to inspect the contents of the
chroot of an active build and maybe interfere with it (e.g. via /tmp
in the chroot, which has 1777 permission).
To prevent this, the root is now a subdirectory of .chroot, which has
permission 700 and is owned by root/root.
