This works because the `builder` and `args` variables are only used
in the non-builtin code path.
Co-Authored-By: Théophane Hufschmitt <theophane.hufschmitt@tweag.io>
https://github.com/NixOS/nix/pull/10456 fixed the addition of symlink
store paths to the sandbox, but also made it so that the hardcoded
sandbox paths (like `/etc/hosts`) were now bind-mounted without
following the possible symlinks. This made these files unreadable if
there were symlinks (because the sandbox would now contain a symlink to
an unreachable file rather than the underlying file).
In particular, this broke FOD derivations on NixOS as `/etc/hosts` is a
symlink there.
Fix that by canonicalizing all these hardcoded sandbox paths before
adding them to the sandbox.
(cherry picked from commit acbb1523c1)
This patch has been manually adapted from
14dc84ed03
Tested with:
$ NIX_SSL_CERT_FILE=$(nix-build '<nixpkgs>' -A cacert)/etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt nix-build --store $(mktemp -d) -E 'import <nix/fetchurl.nix> { url = https://google.com; }'
warning: found empty hash, assuming 'sha256-AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA='
this derivation will be built:
/nix/store/4qljhy0jj2b0abjzpsbyarpia1bqylwc-google.com.drv
building '/nix/store/4qljhy0jj2b0abjzpsbyarpia1bqylwc-google.com.drv'...
error:
… writing file '/nix/store/0zynn4n8yx59bczy1mgh1lq2rnprvvrc-google.com'
error: unable to download 'https://google.com': Problem with the SSL CA cert (path? access rights?) (77)
error: builder for '/nix/store/4qljhy0jj2b0abjzpsbyarpia1bqylwc-google.com.drv' failed with exit code 1
Now returns:
nix-env % NIX_SSL_CERT_FILE=$(nix-build '<nixpkgs>' -A cacert)/etc/ssl/certs/ca-bundle.crt nix-build --store $(mktemp -d) -E 'import <nix/fetchurl.nix> { url = https://google.com; }'
this derivation will be built:
/nix/store/4qljhy0jj2b0abjzpsbyarpia1bqylwc-google.com.drv
building '/nix/store/4qljhy0jj2b0abjzpsbyarpia1bqylwc-google.com.drv'...
error: hash mismatch in fixed-output derivation '/nix/store/4qljhy0jj2b0abjzpsbyarpia1bqylwc-google.com.drv':
specified: sha256-AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
got: sha256-5xXEhGtnRdopaUTqaz2M1o2NE7ovhU0SjcSOPwntqwY=
(cherry picked from commit 1fbdf409524bb350b8614f3d95067cb9ba3c57f2)
This is better for privacy and to avoid leaking netrc credentials in a
MITM attack, but also the assumption that we check the hash no longer
holds in some cases (in particular for impure derivations).
Partially reverts 5db358d4d7.
(cherry picked from commit c04bc17a5a)
Caused by 1d3696f0fb
Without this fix the kept build directory is readable only by root
```
$ sudo ls -ld /comp-temp/nix-build-openssh-static-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl-9.8p1.drv-5
drwx------ root root 60 B Wed Sep 11 00:09:48 2024 /comp-temp/nix-build-openssh-static-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl-9.8p1.drv-5/
$ sudo ls -ld /comp-temp/nix-build-openssh-static-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl-9.8p1.drv-5/build
drwxr-xr-x nixbld1 nixbld 80 B Wed Sep 11 00:09:58 2024 /comp-temp/nix-build-openssh-static-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl-9.8p1.drv-5/build/
```
(cherry picked from commit ebebe626ff)
The recent fix for CVE-2024-38531 broke the sandbox on macOS
completely. As it’s not practical to use `chroot(2)` on
macOS, the build takes place in the main filesystem tree, and the
world‐unreadable wrapper directory prevents the build from accessing
its `$TMPDIR` at all.
The macOS sandbox probably shouldn’t be treated as any kind of a
security boundary in its current state, but this specific vulnerability
wasn’t possible to exploit on macOS anyway, as creating `set{u,g}id`
binaries is blocked by sandbox policy.
Locking down the build sandbox further may be a good idea in future,
but it already has significant compatibility issues. For now, restore
the previous status quo on macOS.
Thanks to @alois31 for helping me come to a better understanding of
the vulnerability.
Fixes: 1d3696f0fbCloses: #11002
(cherry picked from commit af2e1142b1)
(cherry picked from commit 9feee13952)
After the fix for CVE-2024-38531, this was only removing the nested
build directory, rather than the top‐level temporary directory.
Fixes: 1d3696f0fb
(cherry picked from commit 76e4adfaac)
(cherry picked from commit 0d68b40dda)
When sandboxing is disabled, we cannot put $TMPDIR underneath an
inaccessible directory.
(cherry picked from commit 86ca2d6d94c0581fda0c666c5e022784952f3542)
(cherry picked from commit 8f58b98770)
Previously, the .chroot directory had permission 750 or 755 (depending
on the uid-range system feature) and was owned by root/nixbld. This
makes it possible for any nixbld user (if uid-range is disabled) or
any user (if uid-range is enabled) to inspect the contents of the
chroot of an active build and maybe interfere with it (e.g. via /tmp
in the chroot, which has 1777 permission).
To prevent this, the root is now a subdirectory of .chroot, which has
permission 700 and is owned by root/root.
(cherry picked from commit af280e72fa0e62e1c2eaccfb992c0dbb6f27f895)
With Nix 2.3, it was possible to pass a subpath of a store path to
exportReferencesGraph:
with import <nixpkgs> {};
let
hello = writeShellScriptBin "hello" ''
echo ${toString builtins.currentTime}
'';
in
writeClosure [ "${hello}/bin/hello" ]
This regressed with Nix 2.4, with a very confusing error message, that
presumably indicates it was unintentional:
error: path '/nix/store/3gl7kgjr4pwf03f0x70dgx9ln3bhl7zc-hello/bin/hello' is not in the Nix store
(cherry picked from commit 0774e8ba33)
Previously, the "file:./" prefix was not correctly recognized in
fixGitURL; instead, it was mistaken as a file path, which resulted in a
parsed url of the form "file://file:./".
This commit fixes the issue by properly detecting the "file:" prefix.
Note, however, that unlike "file://", the "file:./" URI is _not_
standardized, but has been widely used to referred to relative file
paths. In particular, the "git+file:./" did work for nix<=2.18, and was
broken since nix 2.19.0.
Finally, this commit fixes the issue completely for the 2.19 series, but
is still inadequate for the 2.20 series due to new behaviors from the
switch to libgit2. However, it does improve the correctness of parsing
even though it is not yet a complete solution.
(cherry picked from commit 8594f3cd5a)
Instead of running the builds under
`$TMPDIR/{unique-build-directory-owned-by-the-build-user}`, run them
under `$TMPDIR/{unique-build-directory-owned-by-the-daemon}/{subdir-owned-by-the-build-user}`
where the build directory is only readable and traversable by the daemon user.
This achieves two things:
1. It prevents builders from making their build directory world-readable
(or even writeable), which would allow the outside world to interact
with them.
2. It prevents external processes running as the build user (either
because that somehow leaked, maybe as a consequence of 1., or because
`build-users` isn't in use) from gaining access to the build
directory.
Bind-mounting symlinks is apparently not possible, which is why the
thing was failing.
Fortunately, symlinks are small, so we can fallback to copy them at no cost.
Fix https://github.com/NixOS/nix/issues/9579
Co-authored-by: Artturin <Artturin@artturin.com>
(cherry picked from commit 913db9f738)
When querying all paths in a binary cache store, the path's representation
is `<hash>-x` (where `x` is the value of `MissingName`) because the .narinfo
filenames only contain the hash.
Before cc46ea1630 this worked correctly,
because the entire path info was read and the path from this
representation was printed, i.e. in the form `<hash>-<name>`. Since then
however, the direct result from `queryAllValidPaths()` was used as `path`.
Added a regression test to make sure the behavior remains correct.
(cherry picked from commit c80cd6bb06)
It is possible to exfiltrate a file descriptor out of the build sandbox
of FODs, and use it to modify the store path after it has been
registered.
To avoid that issue, don't register the output of the build, but a copy
of it (that will be free of any leaked file descriptor).
According to N4950 20.3.1.3.5 [unique.ptr.single.observers]/1,
the behavior is undefined if get() == nullptr. Use get() instead of
operator*() on a possibly-null unique_ptr.
Fixes#10123.
This PR reduces the creation of short-lived basic_json objects while
parsing flake.lock files. For large flake.lock files (~1.5MB) I was
observing ~60s being spent for trivial nix build operations while
after this change it is now taking ~1.6s.
(cherry picked from commit 7fd0de38c6)
This fixes warnings like
warning: Ignoring setting 'auto-allocate-uids' because experimental feature 'auto-allocate-uids' is not enabled
warning: Ignoring setting 'impure-env' because experimental feature 'configurable-impure-env' is not enabled
when using the daemon and the user didn't actually set those settings.
Note: this also hides those settings from `nix config show`, but that
seems a good thing.
(cherry picked from commit 0acd783190)
It's now up to the caller whether readOnlyMode should be applied. In
some contexts (like InputScheme::fetch()), we always need to fetch.
(cherry picked from commit 7cb4d0c5b7)
Commit 83c067c0fa changed `builtins.pathExists`
to resolve symlinks before checking for existence. Consequently, if the path
refers to a symlink itself, existence of the target of the symlink (instead of
the symlink itself) was checked. Restore the previous behavior by skipping
symlink resolution in the last component.
(cherry picked from commit 89e21ab4bd)
Previously we didn't check that the derivation was fixed-output, so
you could use builtin:fetchurl to impurely fetch a file.
(cherry picked from commit 1ee42c5b88)
As discussed in the maintainer meeting on 2024-01-29.
Mainly this is to avoid a situation where the name is parsed and
treated as a file name, mostly to protect users.
.-* and ..-* are also considered invalid because they might strip
on that separator to remove versions. Doesn't really work, but that's
what we decided, and I won't argue with it, because .-* probably
doesn't seem to have a real world application anyway.
We do still permit a 1-character name that's just "-", which still
poses a similar risk in such a situation. We can't start disallowing
trailing -, because a non-zero number of users will need it and we've
seen how annoying and painful such a change is.
What matters most is preventing a situation where . or .. can be
injected, and to just get this done.
(cherry picked from commit f1b4663805)
